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ARTICLES
WHY THE CRISIS WAS UNAVOIDABLE AND
WHY TARP DID NOT HELP
Aditya (Adi) Habbu
INTRODUCTION
Many politicians, economists, and academics have blamed the 2008
financial crisis on the greed of Wall Street.' Some argue that deregu-
lation of the financial industry, predatory lending, and the pursuit of
fees created the crisis which almost toppled our financial markets.'
While greed, corruption, and deregulation may certainly have had a
significant role in the crisis, this article suggests that the crisis was not
necessarily the result of bad behavior by Wall Street. Instead, the cri-
sis may have been unavoidable because of overly optimistic assump-
tions and simple agency conflicts.
Many have produced compelling empirical work to explain how va-
rious government policies and securitization exacerbated the crisis,
however, given the complexity of the system, finding empirical proof
for any set of causes is difficult.' This article takes a different ap-
proach. To illustrate how agency conflicts and assumptions could
have created this crisis, I will develop a set of simple economic models.
These models will be over-simplified, yet will illustrate how bad behav-
ior and predatory lending are not required to explain the collapse of
1. Anup Shah, Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL ISSUEs (last updated Dec. 11,
2010), http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis.
2. See Peter J. Wallison, Barney Frank, Predatory Lending, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424052 7 48 7 0410 7 20 4 5 7 4 4 7
5110152189446.html.
3. See Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evi-
dence from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis, 124 Q.J. EcoN. 1449 (2009). Some
have argued that oversupply of credit, perhaps, fueled by securitization and
fee-generation played an essential role in the crisis. Id.; see also Adam J.
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble (Univ. of Pa. Inst.
for Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 10-15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1669401. Others have suggested that government policy was the
source of the crisis. See John B. Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy
Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went Wrong (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Res., Working Paper No. 14631, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w14631.
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our banking infrastructure. Even if bad behavior did play a role, this
model suggests that regulating bad behavior alone would not have
been enough to avoid the crisis.
After using the model to demonstrate how the crisis may have oc-
curred, I analyze how TARP I and TARP II could have impacted the
problem. Further, I use this model to discuss what forms of capital
injection might have been most valuable in stabilizing the banking
sector. Then I discuss what types of regulation might have avoided
this crisis based on the assumptions in my economic model. In partic-
ular, I conclude that the crisis may have been unavoidable without
substantial intervention.
I begin by creating a simple model for understanding a bank's bal-
ance sheet, then I use this model to illustrate how loan default destabi-
lized the banking sector. Section II discusses the basics of how to
value a loan and Section III uses the tools of Section II to develop a
model for understanding securitization of home loans. In particular,
I discuss the agency conflicts created by securitization. Using the
models of II and III, Section IV demonstrates how cheap credit and
appreciating real estate prices created a reverse feedback loop that is
at the heart of this crisis. Section V attempts to compile all the infor-
mation from the previous sections to illustrate how the crisis hap-
pened. In addition, I highlight that although bad behavior plays no
role in this particular model, the model explains an equally cata-
strophic result. Section VI discusses the intentions of TARP I and II
and addresses what forms of capital injection may be most valuable
from a prudential perspective. Finally, I close with an analysis that
indicates that prior regulation may not have averted this crisis.
I. THE BANK'S BALANCE SHEET
I begin by looking at a bank's balance sheet and by determining the
basics of how the crisis has crippled banks.' A bank has assets, liabili-
4. Keep in mind that the example assumes a "dynamic" balance sheet not a
GAAP balance sheet. In a dynamic balance sheet an accountant will mark
to market all assets immediately. See Paraschivescu Marius Dumitru &
Pacurari Doina, Balance-Sheet Theories and Their Cognitive Dynamism, 3
ANALELE UNIVERSTATTIi DIN ORADEA 1376, 1377 (2009) (Rom.). Thus the
accountant will alter the assets to reflect their actual value instead of their
book value. See Newt Gingrich, Suspend Mark-To-Market Now!, FORBES.COM
(Sept. 29, 2008, 6:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/29/mark-to-
market-oped-cx ng_0929gingrich.html. Further, these adjustments will be
made as soon as they become relevant instead of waiting till the end of the
year. See id. A GAAP accounting balance sheet will leave most assets at book
value. See STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIs STRATEGIES FOR
SPECULATIVE INVESTORs 45 (2005); see also Bruno Biais et al., A Dynamic The-
ory of the Balance Sheet (May 7, 2004) available at http://www.wcas.north
western.edu/csio/Conferences/CSIO-IDEI-2004/BMPRmay7.pdf.
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ties, and shareholders' equity like any other business.5 Like any other
business, Assets = Liabilities + Shareholders' Equity.' The assets are
loans made to companies and individuals and a host of other securi-
ties.' Often these loans are securitized loans;' however, for now, only
look at primary, non-securitized loans.'
In addition to assets/loans, banks also have liabilities and equity.'o
Equity is the money that investors give to a company so that they have
a claim on the residual profits of a company." In the case of Citi, the
equity is the stock of the company." Each year, shareholders have a
claim on all profits that a company makes." Assuming that liabilities
stay fixed, if the value of the assets goes up then the value of equity
also goes up.1 4 Likewise, if the value of the assets goes down then the
value of equity also will go down.1 5
5. Gaurav Akrani, Balance Sheet of Commercial Bank- Liabilities and Assets, KALYAN
CrIv LIFE BLOG (Sept. 24, 2010, 12:09 AM), http://kalyan-city.blogspot.
com/2010/09/balance-sheet-of-commercial-bank.html.
6. INT'L ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMM., INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STAN-
DARDs EXPLAINED, 178-79 (2000) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING
EXPLAINED].
7. Id.
8. Id. at 447; see also Cameron L. Cowan, Partner, Orrick, Herrington & Sut-
cliffe, LLP, Am. Securitization Forum, Hearing on Protecting Homeowners:
Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit (Nov. 5,
2003).
9. For purposes of this article the distinction between a bank and a bank hold-
ing company will not be discussed in detail. See ARTHUR SULLIVAN & STEVEN
SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES IN ACTION 421 (2003) (explaining the dis-
tinction and the importance it plays in the banking system).
10. See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING EXPLAINED, supra note 6, at 179.
11. Equity Capital, SPRINGBOARD ENTERPRISES, http://www.springboardenter
prises.org / learningcenter / equitymarketfundamentals / sourcesofcapital/
equitycapital (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
12. See Citigroup Financial Snapshot, CITICROUP FIN., http://www.citigroup.
com/citi/fin/data/snapshotl103.pdf?ieNocache=10 (last visited Sept. 13,
2011).
13. While this statement is true, a shareholder can only receive value from a
company in the form of dividends. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOOD-
MAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 184 (6th ed. 2003).
Thus, a company's stock price will be the discounted value of all expected
dividends to the stockholder. John Y. Campbell & Albert S. Kyle, Smart
Money, Noise Trading and Stock Price Behavior, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1993).
This level of detail is not relevant to my analysis. See generally WILLIAM MEG-
GINSON & Scorr SMART, INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE FINANCE (2008) (in-
troducing the theoretical underpinning of stock prices).
14. Encyclopedia of Everyday Law, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/everyday-law-
encyclopedia/shareholder-rights (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). In reality lia-
bilities will change regularly for a bank. THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY & FINANCE 121 (Peter Newman & Murray Milgate & John Eatwell
eds. 1992). However, accounting for this movement does not add any value
to my model. In addition, liability movements for a bank are not large
enough to study in this case. Thus, I ignore a bank's changing liabilities
for the purposes of my model.
15. See ROBERT PARRINO & DAVID S. KIDWELL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 57-58 (2009).
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Banks also have liabilities.'" Speaking in generalities, which will be
helpful to the model I will build, banks generally have three types of
liabilities: 1) deposits; 2) long term debt; and 3) short term debt.1 7
Deposits are the accounts that corporations have at Citi.1" Long-term
debts are the loans that the banks have taken from someone else."
The bank must make regular payments on this debt.2 0 Short-term
debts are the loans that the bank must pay back within less than a
year.
If the loans and securities that make up a bank's assets significantly
drop in value then the bank's assets may exceed its liabilities.22 When
this happens the bank is insolvent and it has "failed."2 3 This is essen-
tially what happened to many banks in the U.S. during this crisis.2 4
However, instead of holding one big loan to GE, Citi and UBS2" had a
number of Collateralized Debt Obligations as their Loan Assets that
suddenly lost value.2 ' The mechanics of Collateralized Debt are dis-
cussed in Section II and III. Notice that if a particular bank has more
equity compared to debt, then a devaluing of the loans and securities
16. GLENN G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING FINANCE 784 (1994).
17. See Steve Kaplan, The Bailout: A Primer, FORBES.COM (Oct. 17, 2008, 12:01
AM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/16/bailout-primer-crisis-oped-cx-
sk_1017kaplan.html.
18. See 12 U.S.C.A. §1813 (West 2010).
19. See JOHN GRAHAM, ScoTT B. SMART & WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, CORPORATE
FINANCE: LINKING THEORY TO WHAT COMPANIES Do 547 (Michael R. Reyn-
olds ed., 3rd ed. 2007).
20. See id.
21. See id. This article does not discuss how bank liabilities are priced. How-
ever, this is also an interesting area of regulation policy. While not dis-
cussed here, it is feasible that uncertainty in liability values also contributed
to the crisis. See Alessio M. Pacces, Uncertainty and the Financial Crisis 21
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 159, 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1564103; see also Gary
Gorton & Anthony M. Santomero, Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated
Debt, 22J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 119, 119-28 (1990) (offering an intro-
duction to banking liability valuation and the problems it may cause).
22. See MORAD CHOUDRY, BANK ASSET AND LIABILIlY MANAGEMENT: STRATEGY,
TRADING, ANALYSIs 265 (2007).
23. See Lee S. Alston, Wayne A. Grove & David C. Wheelock, Why Do Banks Fail?
Evidence from the 1920s, 31 EXPLORATIONS IN EcoN. HISTORY 409 (1994).
There is a great deal of literature studying the past failures of banks. Id.
24. See David S. Hilzenrath, Year was Worst for Bank Failures Since S&L Crisis in
1992, WASH. PosT, Dec. 29, 2010, at A10.
25. UBS was founded as Union Bank of Switzerland in the mid nineteenth cen-
tury. See History of UBS, UBS, http://www.ubs.com/l/e/about/history/
1850_1899/1850.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
26. See Carrick Mollenkamp, David Reilly & Edward Taylor, Subprime Hits Seem
Likely to Keep Coming; Banks Like UBS, Citi May Face More Charges Than They've
Yet Taken, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at C1. Appendix 1 includes an actual
bank balance sheet. This helps the reader grasp the difference between a
dynamic balance sheet and an actual GAAP balance sheet.
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may not lead to a bank's failure.2 ' However, banks traditionally oper-
ate with a leverage ratio of at least 1 to 12 and as much as 1 to 40."
Thus, banks could be made insolvent by even a minor devaluing of
their loans and securities. 29
The types of Loan Assets that banks had on the asset side of their
balance sheet are discussed and Section II and help illustrate how
these assets lost value so quickly and how they lead to bank insolvency.
II. VALUING A HOME MORTGAGE LOAN
Many of the assets on the Loan Asset side of the Bank Balance Sheet
were securitized home loans.so To understand how these assets lost
value so quickly, I develop a simplified model for understanding how
home loans are valued, and how they are valued after they are
securitized.s
Suppose that all homes cost $100 and there is only one type of
home loan.3 2 The home loan allows one to borrow $100 today at 10
percent interest. The $100 with interest ($110) is due back to the
27. Thomas F. Hellmann, Kevin C. Murdock, &Joseph E. Stiglitz, Liberalization,
Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements
Enough?, 90 THE AM. ECON. REV. 147 (2000).
28. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION 147 (2008) (illustrating capital ratios for the ten
largest banks in the United States as of December 31, 2003). Banking lever-
age ratios are strictly regulated by the Basel Accords. Id; see also David En-
rich, Basel Rules on Track-New Capital, Leverage Limits on Banks, WALL ST. J.,
July 17, 2010, at B4. There are different rules for bank holding companies
and for investment banks. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE COMMERCIAL
BANKING REGULATORY HANDBOOK 83-84 (2001). In addition, the Basel re-
quirements arguably leave room for a bank to take on a considerable
amount of risk without violating the Basel leverage ratios. See DANIEL K.
TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION (2008).
29. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008).
30. Tara E. Gaschler, Understanding the Securitization Process and the Impact on
Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, ABIWORLD.ORG (Dec. 2009) http://www.abiworld
.org/committees/newsletters/consumer/vol7numl2/securitization.pdf.
31. Again this will be a simplified version of home loan and collateralized debt
valuation. I skip much of the analytic rigor that does not explicitly aid the
present discussion. However, to learn more about the basic of asset back
security valuation, see CHARLEs STONE & ANNE ZIssu, THE SECURITIZATION
HANDBOOK: STRUCTURE AND DYNAMIcs OF MORTGAGE AND ASSET-BACKED SE-
CURITIEs 45-80 (2005).
32. This is substantial oversimplification. There are a number of different
types of home loans available to a consumer. One of the mortgages availa-
ble is called an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM). The interest rate on these
mortgages is pegged to a financial index such as LIBOR. Sandra Block,
Brace Yourself if You Have a LIBOR-linked ARM, USATODAY.COM (Oct. 22,
2008) http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/columnist/block/2008-10-
20-ym-libor-arm-mortgageN.htm. Some have suggested that these mort-
gage are sold to ill-informed individuals who will not be able to pay off their
loan if the rate increases. See Glenn Setzer, Option ARMs At The Center of
2011] 5
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bank in one year. In addition, assume that there is a risk-free rate of 6
percent." This means that the bank could make a 6 percent return
on $100 without taking any risk by merely investing in U.S. treasuries.
Further assume that all banks know that 50 percent of people can pay
back the loan while 50 percent cannot pay it back. In the event that
the individual cannot pay the loan back, the bank is able to seize the
house which will be worth the same $100 in a year. At this point in the
scenario, there is no securitization of these loans.
If the Bank gives loans randomly, then the expected value of the
loan will be (50% x 110) + (50% x 100) = $105.34 But if the bank
instead just invests in U.S. treasuries, it will make a return in one year
of $106. Thus, the bank will not give loans randomly. If a bank has to
put its money at risk, it will go out of its way to make sure that an
individual that wants a loan is one of the 50 percent that will pay the
loan back.15 It does not want to take the risk of losing money com-
pared to a risk free investment.36
Now assume that housing prices are appreciating at a rate of 5 per-
cent. If the Bank randomly gives loans, then the expected value of the
loan will be (50% x 110) + (50% x 105) = $107.50." Thus, a bank
could start making loans to people randomly and it would still be bet-
ter off than if it invested in risk-free treasuries.
Thus, in the current model, appreciating house prices could make
it profitable to give home loans to both creditworthy and non-
creditworthy individuals." This conflict becomes more difficult to
manage when these loans are securitized." I discuss how loans are
securitized in the next section.
Rate Shock Fears, MORTGAGENEWSDAILY.COM (Sept. 11, 2006) http:www.
mortgagenewsdaily.com/9112006_Option ARMMortgage.asp.
33. This is merely an illustration. The treasury rate usually varies between 3 -
5%. See Treasury Bill (T-Bill) Indexes, MORTGAGE-X, http://mortgage-x.com/
general/indexes/t-bill.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
34. For more on expected values and their application to law, see RICHARD Pos-
NER, AN EcoNoMic ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, (5th ed. 2006).
35. See Treasury Bill (T-Bill) Indexes, MORTGAGE-X, http://mortgage-x.com/
general/indexes/t-bill.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
36. See The Debt-Ceiling Debate: The Death of the "Risk-Free" Investment, MONEY
MORNING (July 28, 2011), http://moneymorning.com/2011/07/28/the-
debt-ceiling-debate-the-death-of-the-risk-free-investment/.
37. Note that I am currently assuming that the banks are loaning "randomly."
This is not to imply that the banks are not screening individuals at all. In-
stead, I am trying to model a scenario in which the banks are only doing a
cursory screening and not a more rigorous analysis. This assumption is
consistent with the behavior of home loan originators before the financial
collapse. See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y.
TIMEs, (Aug. 26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/
yourmoney/26country.html.
38. It is quite clear that there was a substantial increase in housing prices in the
years before the crisis. See Jonathan McCarthy & Richard W. Peach, Are
Home Prices the Next Bubble?, 10 EcON. PoL'v REV. 1, 1 (2004).
39. See discussion infra Section III.
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III. SECURITIZING HOME LOANS
Above I described the behavior of a corner store bank that keeps
and services all the loans that it originates. Now I look at a situation in
which there are no corner banks that hold on to all the loans that they
originate; instead, there is a Countrywide at each corner.
Countrywide is a loan originator, and after it has made a loan to an
individual it sells the right to that loan to an Arranger.40 An Arranger
buys loans from Countrywide locations all over America and creates
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)." A CDO dices up all the
cash flows generated by these thousands of individual home loans and
sells these securities (CDOs) to the banks and other institutional
investors."2
Arranger sells these
CDO's to the banks wn knun, 
T
Arranger buys
thousands of
loans from each
originator and Or ntX r Onnatr
makes a CDO lCa\ifornut Ilil ioi N York
The banks UBS, Goldman, Citi, etc. would rather own a piece of a
CDO than an individual loan because there is more diversification
and thus less risk to owning a single loan." If UBS owned only loans
40. See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of
Subprime Mortgage Credit, 318 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP. 1, 5 (2008)
(describing the process by which loans are sold to an arranger by a loan
originator). Countrywide is the third largest Subprime Mortgage Origina-
tor. Id. at 4.
41. See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of
Subprime Mortgage Credit, 318 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. STAFF REP. 1, 3-4
(2008); see also STAFF ON S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERN-
MENTAL AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 1, 251 (Comm. Print 2011)
(describing the process by which arrangers create CDOs and the many
methods of diversification including geographic diversification).
42. See Collateral Debt Organizations Time Topic, N.Y. TIMES, available at http://
topics.nytimes.com /topics/ reference/ timestopics / subjects/ c/ collateral
ized-debt-obligations/index.html ("CDOs are created by banks that pool to-
gether otherwise unrelated debt-instruments, like bonds, and then sell
shares of that pool to investors").
43. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY RE-
PORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 193-94 (2011)
(explaining the effect of geographic diversification on CDOs).
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from Texas then a natural disaster in Texas that destroyed all the
homes would make all of UBS's loans worthless. Instead, if UBS owns
a CDO that is funded by loans from all over the country, then no
natural disaster could entirely devalue all of UBS's loans.4 4 Any one
disaster would have less impact. Thus, it is best for the bank to own
CDOs instead of individual loans."
Pricing the CDO
Now it must be determined what price the arranger will pay to each
Countrywide location for a loan and it must be determined what price
the banks will pay for the CDO. In order to do this, I will step though
all the agency problems that exist in this arrangement; for the pur-
poses of the following example assume that the arranger only pays
one price to all Countrywide locations."6
Because each Countrywide location knows that they will get a fixed
price per loan, each location will have little or no motivation to check
44. PATRICIA A. McCoy & ELIZABETH RENUART, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES,
HARVARD UNIV., THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF SUBPRIME AND NONTRADI-
TIONAL HOME MORTGAGES 7-10 (2008), available at http://wwwjchs.
harvard .edu / publications / finance / understanding consumer-credit /
papers/ucc08-5_mccoy-renuart.pdf. A properly diversified mortgage
backed security would not be diversified based on geography alone. It
would also be diversified based on the credit ratings of the borrowers, the
price range of the house that was bought, the type of neighborhood that
the houses were located, etc. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the
Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23J. OF ECON. PERSP. 77 (2009) avail-
able at www.princeton.edu/-markus/research/papers/liquidity-credit
crunch.pdf. The arrangers may have added another level of risk by only
bundling subprime mortgages with one another. Thus, instead of diversify-
ing risk, the risk of subprime lenders defaulting was concentrated into a
number of mortgage backed securities.
45. While not directly relevant to this discussion, it is interesting to note that
some research indicates that banks are not as well diversified as they should
be. See ANDREAS KAMP ET AL., Do BANKS DIVERSIFY LOAN PORTFOLIOS? A
TENTATIVE ANSWER BASED ON INDIVIDUAL BANK LoAN PORTFOLIOS (2005).
46. This simplifying assumption is an accurate representation of reality if we
assume that the costs of monitoring each Countrywide are very high. For
example, assume that the arranger will only pay full price for "high quality"
loans. The arranger would need a system of monitoring whether or not a
given Countrywide location is generating high quality or low quality loans.
See Kenneth J. Kopecky & David D. VanHoose, Capital Regulation, Heterogene-
ous Monitoring Costs, and Aggregate Loan Quality (Baylor U. Hankamer Sch. of
Bus., Working Paper No. 2005-060-ECO, 2004), available at http://business.
baylor.edu/economics-papers/EWPSO60.pdf. This would be very expen-
sive to enforce. See id. The arranger would have to establish a loan stan-
dards protocol and he would then have to monitor the originator closely.
Instead, the arranger could rationally assume that each Countrywide loca-
tion will sell him a mix of GOOD and BAD securities. This is the method
used in this model. "An originator is an entity that initiates a funds transfer
subject the UCC article 4A." Black's Law Dictionary 1210 (9th ed. 2009).
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if a person is creditworthy." Each Countrywide employee is paid on a
commission which is based on the volume of loans that he gener-
ates." Thus, locations are incentivized to generate many loans re-
gardless of whether they are good loans or bad loans."
The arranger understands that this incentive structure exists. But
the arranger does not have the resources to check which Country-
wides have good and bad procedures."o So he builds this uncertainty
into the single price he pays all Countrywide locations for a loan.
He assumes that 50 percent of Countrywide locations have GOOD
credit check procedures and that 50 percent of Countrywide facilities
have BAD credit check procedures. A GOOD credit procedure is a
Countrywide that makes 60 percent of their loans to people that will
pay back the loan and 40 percent of their loans to people that will not
pay back the loan. The value of a GOOD loan is (40% x 105) + (60%
x 110) = $108. A BAD credit procedure is a Countrywide that makes
60 percent bad loans and 40 percent good loans. Thus each loan
from a BAD Countrywide is worth (60% x 105) + (40% x 110) = $107.
Since the arranger knows that 50 percent of the loans are from
GOOD Countrywide locations and 50 percent of the loans will be
from BAD Countrywide locations, he is willing to pay (50% x 107) +
(50% x 108) = $107.50 per loan.
Assume that there are only four Countrywide locations which each
generate 1,000 loans and that four banks each buy a quarter of the
47. Note that this assumption creates a bit of a circularity problem. One could
argue that the arranger's decision to only pay one price leads to poor qual-
ity controls at origination. Or, one could argue that poor quality controls
force the arranger to pay one price for all mortgages. However, I ignore
this circularity issue since it does not affect the outcome of our analysis.
48. This is a reasonable approximation of the employee incentives before the
crisis. See Gori MATEL, MORTGAGE BROKER COMMISSIONS AND INCENTIVES - A
PRIMER (2009), available at http://www.qcommission.com/doc/Mortgage-
Broker-SalesCommissions-A-Primer-Article.pdf.
49. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug.
26, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/business/yourmoney/26
country.html.
50. Id.
51. See Abigail Field, Bank of America Sued for Countrywide's Mortgage Sins, Again,
DAILYFINANCE (Jan. 25, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://dailyfinance.com/2011/01/
25/bank-of-america-sued-for-countrywides-mortgage-sins-again/.
52. Before the crisis, many originators were issuing loans with few, if any, credit
check procedures or covenants. "If you had a pulse, we gave you a loan": Inside,
the fiasco that led to the mortgage mess and Countrywide's collapse, DATELINE NBC
(Mar. 22, 2009, 7:32 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29827248/ns/
dateline nbc-the hansen files with chrishansen/t/if-you-had-pulse-we-
gave-you-loan/. These were called Covenant Lite loans. See Bolton Warns of
Bubble Fuelled by "Cov-Lit" Loans, FIN. TIMES (May 18, 2009), http:www.ft.
com/intl/cms/s/2/6d754668-0531-1 1dc-bl51OOOb5dfI0621.html#axzzlX1
E2Mb4h. Some feared that these would lead to a housing bubble. See id. In
particular, an analyst at Fidelity named Anthony Bolton argued that cov-lit
would be the "the tinder paper for a serious reversal in the market." Id.
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CDO from the arranger at the face value paid by the arranger. 3
Thus, the arranger pays (4 x 1,000 x 107.5) = $430,000 total to all the
Countrywide originators, and each Bank pays $107,500 for one quar-
ter of the CDO. These numbers are not used now but they will be-
come relevant in Section V.
Now, between Section III and IV, there is a model for understand-
ing home loan prices and home loan securitization. Before combin-
ing all these sections to analyze the model it is necessary to study
another element of the mortgage market: the connection between
cheap credit and appreciating real estate prices.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REAL ESTATE PRICES AND
CHEAP CREDIT
This section argues that it is possible for cheap credit to create real
estate appreciation and for real estate appreciation to make credit
cheaper.54 This relationship, and the fact that few realized this rela-
tionship, will play an integral role in the Section V analysis of the 2008
Mortgage Crisis."
Again I begin with a set of assumptions. First I assume that there is
only one kind of house. This house sells for $100. Assume that all
individuals get the same interest rate of 10 percent. There are some
individuals that can afford this interest rate and others that cannot.
53. The estimated size of the U.S. asset backed securities market is $8.9 trillion.
David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv. 277,
291 (2010).
54. Before proceeding, it is important to define the term "cheap credit."
Credit should be priced based on the risk involved in a given transaction.
See Loan Pricing Disclosure, WELLS FARGO HOME MORTG., https://
www.wellsfargo.com/mortgage/rates/pricingdisclosure (last visited Sept.
23, 2011). For a home loan, this includes that value of the collateral (the
house) and the likelihood that the borrower will be able to pay back the
loan. See id. If credit is offered at a rate that does not compensate for these
risks then the credit is "Cheap." See REGIME CHANGES: MACROECONOMIC
POLICY AND REGULATION IN EUROPE FROM THE 1930S TO THE 1990s 184-90
(Douglas J. Forsyth & Ton Notermans eds., 1997). There are many moving
parts in macroeconomic credit policy. See id. The Federal Reserve has broad
discretion to manipulate the rate at which credit is made available to the
banks. THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 46 (9th ed.
2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pfcomplete.pdf.
This in turn will affect that rate at which consumers are lent credit. See id.
While this is an important issue, I will not discuss the macroeconomic issues
or the discretion of the Federal Reserve in this article. See Christina D.
Romer & David H. Romer, Federal Reserve Information and the Behavior of Inter-
est Rates, 90 THE AM. EcoN. REv. 429, 429-57 (2000) (discussing the Federal
Reserve's impact on the interest rates).
55. John Paulson, the manager of a small hedge fund, recognized the problem
in housing two years in advance and traded on his hunch to make an enor-
mous amount of money. See Gregory Zuckerman, Trader Made Billions on
Subprime, WALL ST.J., (Jan. 15, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/article
/SB120036645057290423.html.
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However, those that cannot afford 10 percent interest rates may be
able to afford a lower interest rate.
Based on the current availability of houses on the market and the
price of financing, the supply and demand of houses is at an equilib-
rium price and quantity.
Supply and Demand of
P
r
1
e Demand
Quantity
The equilibrium price (PI) is currently $100.
Now assume that by government action the standard rate of interest
reduces to 9 percent. More people will now be able to afford
houses." Thus, there will be more demand for houses." This will
result in an outward shift of the demand curve.
Supply and Demand of Housing
P S.,.~
c' D2e DI
Quantity
Note that because houses take time to build, there will only be Qx
houses available. This means that housing prices will temporarily
spike to P2 before supply catches up and it finally settles at the new
equilibrium price of P3. Regardless, home values have permanently
increased."
56. SUZANNE TRIMBATH & JUAN MONTOYA, HOUSING AFFORDABILITY IN THREE
DIMENSIONS: PRICE, INCOME AND INTEREST RATEs 3 (2002).
57. Id.
58. There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that housing prices were in-
creasing rapidly in the years before the bubble. See Nathalie Girouard et
al., Recent House Pice Developments: The Role of Fundamentals 5-8 (Org. for
Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working Papers No. 475, 2006).
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Supply and Demand of Housing
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This permanent increase in housing prices could have an effect on
the rate of credit.59 Consider the home loan pricing model that was
discussed in Section II. Originally the price of the house in the event
of a foreclosure was a relevant factor in how a loan was priced.o If
Countrywide assumed that 50 percent of people would default, then,
in the event of default, Countrywide would only receive the value of
the house plus the rate of appreciation."
Thus the value of a loan for Countrywide was:
(100 x (1+10%) x 50%) + (100 x (1+5%) x 50%) = $107.50.
But if the increased demand in housing has increased the rate of
appreciation in housing to 6 percent instead of 5 percent then Coun-
trywide's new loan value is:
(100 x (1+10%) x 50%) + (100 x (1+7%) x 50%) = $108.50.
In Section III Countrywide is paid a fixed amount for each loan." I
assume that the arranger pays Countrywide $107.50 for each loan.
Countrywide does not want to give the arranger a more valuable
loan." Instead, each Countrywide corner store would rather generate
more loans and keep the value of the loan exactly the same.64 Thus,
Countrywide will lower its interest rate so that the loans are each still
worth $107.50.
(100 x (1 + x) x 50%) + (100 x (1+7%) x 50%) = $107.50
x = (107.5 - 53.5)/50 - 1
x = 8%
So Countrywide will reduce their rates to 8 percent.
This may again result in an increase in housing prices which would,
in turn, reduce the rate or credit. Thus, our model is never in a static
equilibrium; instead it is evolving and changing over time.
59. Id. at 31.
60. See supra Section II.
61. See supra Section II.
62. See supra Section III.
63. See supra Section III.
64. See supra Section 1111.
65. Researchers at the Santa Fe Institute are currently trying to understand how
financial markets can be better understood using non-linear, none-
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In this economic model, it seems feasible that cheap credit in-
creased houses prices which in turn decreased the rate on home loan
credit.
With all these building blocks in place, I can now turn to an analysis
of how a few incorrect assumptions could have created the Housing
Crisis of 2008.
V. EXPLAINING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Sections I - IV to demonstrate how rational mispricing could have
created bank insolvency. I will begin by combining the pricing mod-
els of the previous sections into one pricing model.
Below are all the assumptions made by the arrangers and by the
Countrywide installations when pricing loans. The following chart
shows that arrangers will buy loans from both Countrywides with
GOOD and BAD credit checks for $107.50 if we make the below as-
sumptions about house appreciation and about default rates.
quilibrium dynamics like the one described here. J. Doyne Farmer & John
Geanakoplos, The Virtues and Vices of Equilibrium and the Future of Financial
Economics, WILEY PERIODICALS, INC., Vol. 14, No. 3, available at http://cowles
.econ.yale.edu/-gean/art/pl274.pdf. In the book, Origins of Wealth, Eric
Beinhocker discusses the most recent research of Doyne Farmer. ERIC. D.
BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY, AND THE
RADICAL REMAKING OF EcoNoMics (2006). Farmer is attempting to debunk
the long held belief that markets actually ever reach a point of equilibrium.
See id. Traditional economic theory argues that stock prices are determined
entirely by the fundamental value of each underlying company. BEIN-
HOCKER, supra, at 393. According to the traditional view, any variation
around the "true market price" is merely random noise. Id. This must be
the case because if there was a mispricing in the market, traders would
quickly arbitrage these profits away. Id. at 396. Farmer's research, however,
indicates that mispricings and trends can exist without being entirely arbi-
traged away for months and years. Id. Farmer argues that this is possible
because financial markets have no static equilibrium; instead they are con-
stantly evolving "ecosystems." Id. at 396-97. Beinhocker likens the trad-
ers'struggle to that of a person adjusting the temperature of a shower. Id.
In the model I created, the interest rate's behavior is non linear. As pre-
dicted by Farmer, it would be difficult to devise a trading strategy that
would bring this feedback loop to any sort of equilibrium. See id. None of
the people who made money trading on the crisis made their money by
exploiting the interest rate trade, but instead bet against the bubble. See
ERIC BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGINS OF WEALTH 391-98 (2006).
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Loan pricing by CountryWide
Loans for GOOD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(a) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD 60.0%
(b) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD 40.0%
(c) Value of a home at time one 100.0
(d) Interest rate on loan 10.0%
(e) Rate of home price appreciation 5.0%
(f) Loan value of GOOD CREDIT CountryWide loans 108.0= (a)(c)(1+d) + (b)(c)(1+e)
Loans for BAD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(g) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD 40.0%
(h) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD 60.0%
(1) Value of a home at time one 100.0
(j) Interest rate on loan 10.0%
x (k) Rate of home price appreciation 5.0%
(1) Loan value of BAD CREDIT CountryWide loans 107.0 = (g)(1)(1+j) + (h)(1)(1+1)
Pricing of CDOs by Arranger
(m) Percentage of loans from GOOD Credit CountryWides 50.0%
(n) Percentage of loans from BAD Credit CountryWides 50.0%
(o) Price paid by Arranger for each loan 107.5= (m)(f) + (n)(I)
(p) Number of CountryWide installations 4.0
(q) Number of loans bought from each installations 1000.0
(r) Value of CDO 430,000.0 =(o)(p)(q)
(s) Value of loan sold to each bank 107,500.0 =(r)/(p)
If we then assume that all banks have a leverage ratio of 20 to 1 and
that each bank has 50 percent of its assets in the form of CDOs, we
can look at the banks' current balance sheet below and see that it is
solvent."
66. These portfolio assumptions are merely illustrative. They do not represent
the actual composition of bank balance sheet.
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Now I will analyze the effect of both unrealistic housing appreciation
(Section IV) and the agency conflicts of securitization (Sections II and
III) to explain how the banks became insolvent.
Unrealistic Housing Appreciation
As was shown in Section II, a great deal of a loan's value is based on
the foreclosure value of a home." The value of a home is in large
part based on its appreciation value. It is possible that, as argued in
Section IV, appreciation in home price value was not an economic
appreciation and was merely an artificial appreciation fueled by cheap
credit." If few investors recognized the relationship between cheap
credit and appreciating housing prices, the housing appreciation
would be a constant in all loan pricing models and the value of a loan
would be artificially high."
However, once this housing appreciation bubble bursts, home
prices would crash and subsequently the value of all these home loans
would crash. In our model, home loans only need to decrease by 16.5
percent before the Bank is made insolvent.7 0
67. See supra Section II.
68. See supra Section IV.
69. See supra Section IV.
70. Keep in mind that I am using a dynamic balance sheet; assets will be market
to market. Thus, unlike a GAAP balance sheet, the assets are being
changed immediately if a particular event results in an economic devalua-
tion of the assets. This stands in sharp contrast to the GAAP rules. Mary
Dumon, Mark to Market: Tool or Trouble? INVESTOPEDIA (May 8, 2009), http:/
/www.investopedia.com/articles/fundamental-analysis/09/mark-to-market-
accounting.asp#axzzlYopqbjQY. In GAAP accounting a devalued asset may
be kept on the balance sheet at book value. Id. Further, if the bank does
decide to write down the asset, this affect would not be reflected on the
company's balance sheet till the end of the quarter or the year. Id.
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(e) Rate of home pce appreciation -165%
Assets 
______ Liabilities
CDO 96.750.0 Deposits 68083.4
Other Loans 107. 00 0 Long term 68083.4
Short term 68083.4
Equity -0.2
Thus without aggressive home loan sales tactics, and without any
agency conflict created by securitization, a mere decrease in housing
prices can make the banks insolvent. Notice that it is a reasonably
high leverage ratio (20:1) that allowed the bank to become insolvent.
However, agency conflicts between Countrywide Corner Stores and
arrangers probably did play a significant role in the crisis. So, I will
show this relationship may have also lead to bank insolvency.
Agency Conflicts in Securitization
As I discussed earlier, there are two agency conflicts in my home
loan model. The first is the conflict between individuals and Country-
wide and the second is the conflict between Countrywide and the
arranger.
Countrywide only wants to loan to people that will pay back the
loan. We have assumed that each Countrywide location has a credit
check system. Some Countrywides have GOOD credit check systems
and thus they give 60 percent GOOD loans and 40 percent BAD loans.
Other Countrywides have BAD credit check systems and thus they give
only 40 percent GOOD loans and 60 percent BAD loans. We have
assumed that the arranger believes that 50 percent of the Country-
wides have GOOD credit check systems and 50 percent do not.
In my model, the arranger pays a fixed fee to all Countrywide loca-
tions. Since these locations do not have to hold onto the loan and
since they are paid by volume of loans generated, all Countrywide lo-
cations have an incentive to stop performing credit checks and give as
many loans as possible.
However, even assuming that all Countrywide locations only give 5
percent GOOD loans, and that the arranger has not priced this
agency conflict, this is still not enough to make the banks insolvent in
my model.
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Loans for GOOD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(a) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD
(b) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD
Loans for BAD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(g) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD
(h) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD
5.0%
95.0%
5.0%
95.0%
Thus, within this model, agency conflict alone cannot explain bank
insolvency. However, if we assume the above agency problem coupled
with a modest 4 percent decline in housing prices, we see that the
banks can easily become insolvent.
(e) Rate of home price appreciation -4.0%
Agency conflicts and the poor incentives of Countrywide are not
enough, in my model, to explain the housing crisis. Inflated home
prices and the decline in home value are what seem to fuel the crisis.71
Inflated home prices were not the result of any bad behavior. 2 They
were merely the result of overly bullish expectations by the entire mar-
71. Mara Hart, Comment, Transparency in Lending in the United States and the
United Kingdom: Which Business Model Does it Best? 30 N.W. K. INT'L L. & Bus.
461, 470 (2010).
72. Id.
2011] 17
18 University of Baltimore Journal of Land and Development [Vol. 1
ket." It seems clear that while securitization and predatory lending
may have been rampant, it is not clear that this created the crisis.
Combining Housing Pices and Agency Conflict
Assume that agency problem played some role and that houses
prices also contributed to the insolvency problem in the banks. As-
suming that all Countrywide locations reduce their volume of GOOD
loans by 20 percent, a 9 percent decrease in housing prices will result
in bank insolvency.
Loan Pricing by CountryWide (Assuming Agency Problems)
Loans for GOOD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(a) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD 40.0%
(b) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD 60.0%
(c) Value of a home at time one 100.0
(d) Interest rate on loan 10.0%
(e) Rate of home price appreciation -9.0%
(f) Loan value of GOOD CREDIT CountryWide loans 98.6= (a)(c)(1+d) + (b)(c)(1+e)
Loans for BAD CREDIT CountryWide installations
(g) Percentage of loans assumed to be GOOD 20.0
(h) Percentage of loans assumed to be BAD 80.0%
CDO 96,700.0 Deposits 68083.4
Other Loans 0 00.0 Long term 680834
Short termi 68083.4
Equity -50.2
Again, in this model, it appears that slight incentive mistakes and zero
knowledge of inflated housing prices could have created this crisis
without any type of predatory lending or other Wall Street
misbehavior.
VI. CAPITAL INJECTION PROGRAMS
Looking at one of the insolvent bank balance sheets there are three
possible steps that the government could take to correct the insol-
vency problem of the banking system: 1) buy troubled assets; 2) inject
73. Id.
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equity directly into the banks; and 3) try to make the CDOs more
valuable.
Buying Troubled Assets
Within my model a troubled asset buyback program by the govern-
ment would not be effective at solving the insolvency problem.
Consider the insolvent balance sheet.
Now assume that the government buys all the CDOs at face value.
This does not alleviate the insolvency problem. The bank is still
insolvent.
CDO buyback was the central plan behind TARP 1.74 However, at
the time of TARP 1, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson did not
realize that the banks were insolvent.75 The Treasury believed that
74. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211(a) (1) (West 2008) ("The Secretary is authorized to es-
tablish the Troubled Asset Relief Program (or "TARP") to purchase, and to
make and fund commitments to purchase, troubled assets from any finan-
cial institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Sec-
retary, and in accordance with this chapter and the policies and procedures
developed and published by the Secretary.").
75. See Brian Carny, Bernanke is Fighting the Last War, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008
at All (alteration in original) (quoting Anne Schwartz), available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122428279231046053.html ("The Fed has gone
about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic prob-
lem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the bal-
ance sheets of financial firms are credible").
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the banks merely had a liquidity problem" in that the banks were
solvent but that because CDOs could not be sold easily, the banks did
not have enough cash on hand for everyday working capital."
Thus, a troubled asset buyback by the government is not aimed at
solving bank insolvency, it is aimed at solving liquidity problems.7 8 Be-
cause the problem with the banks was not a liquidity problem but was
instead a solvency problem, TARP 1 failed.
Equity Injection
An equity injection into the banks would solve the insolvency prob-
lem. In TARP II the government realized that there was an insolvency
problem. So they took two primary steps:
1) they insured all Bank Short Term Debt;so and 2) they injected capi-
tal directly into the banks." Looking at my balance sheet, this does in
fact solve the problem of insolvency, but it is also very expensive.
Cash 1,0000 Deposits 68.083.4
CDO 96,7000 Long term 68.083.4
Other Loans Short term 68,083.4
Equity 949.8
Increasing the Value of CDOs
The third way of solving the bank insolvency problem would be to
increase the value of all home loans. Practically, this is very difficult to
do and requires substantial transaction costs. But, it may the best
option.
76. See id.; see also Gerard Baker, If Hank Paulson is Wrong, We can Only Pray, THE
TIMES (Sept. 29, 2008), http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/comments/colum-
nists/article4842926.
77. Id.
78. Interview with Professor Steven Kaplan, Neubauer Family Professor of En-
trepreneurship and Finance, University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business.
79. Treasury Prepares for a TARP-and-Switch. And It's a Good Thing, TIME (Oct. 8,
2008 at 3:49 pm), http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2008/10/08/
treasury-prepares for-a tarpan/.
80. See The Doctor's Bill, THE EcoNoMIsT (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.
economist.com/node/12305746.
81. See Yomarie Silva, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008-2009, 28
Ann. Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 115-16 (2009); see Kimberly Arnadeo, What
Exactly Was the Bank Bailout Bill?, ABOUT.COM (Sept. 24, 2011), http://
useconomy.about.com/od/criticalssues/a/govtbailout.htm
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As discussed earlier, plummeting home prices are really the back-
bone of the financial crisis in my model.12 Consider the final scenario
of Section V. In this scenario, I combined a 9 percent decrease in
housing prices with a 20 percent decrease in GOOD loans across all
Countrywides. This combination resulted in the banks becoming in-
solvent. However, in my model, if housing prices were reinvigorated
so that they only declined by 8 percent instead of the original 9 per-
cent, then the bank would no longer be insolvent."
(e) Rate of home pice appreciation
Assets Uabilitis __
CDO 97,400.0 Deposits 68.083 4
Other Loans 107 00.0 Long term 68,083.4
Short term 68,083.4
Equity 649.8
Increasing housing prices, however, would be quite a herculean task
for the U.S. Government. 4 However, in some ways this is what the
Obama administration is trying to do." For example, the administra-
tion would like to give homeowners more options to refinance their
homes." In addition, President Obama plans to allow bankruptcy
judges to rewrite mortgage terms so that foreclosure is not the only
option." This might increase the value of individual loans which ulti-
mately would increase the value of CDOs.88
However, even if these measures could increase the value of home
loans and CDOs, market confidence is so shaken right now that it is
not clear that CDOs would be given the appropriate valuation." If
82. See supra Section V.
83. See supra chart accompanying Section V.
84. See infra note 98 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
86. See Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Remarks by
the President on the home mortgage crisis (Feb. 18, 2009, 10:25 a.m.),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
mortgage-crisis.
87. See id.
88. See supra note 41.
89. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently voted to
change accounting rules for Mortgage Backed Securities so that the bal-
ance sheet of banks better represent economic reality. Floyd Norris, Banks
Get New Leeway in Valuing Their Assets, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2009, at B. The
current rule required certain securities to be placed on their balance sheet
at market value. Id. Since the market value for MBS had plummeted, many
banks believed that this rule did not adequately represent the value of the
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CDO prices are not acknowledged by the market to be increasing in
value, then the market will still perceive the banks to be insolvent.90
Thus, for the sake of public perception, direct equity investment may
be the most obvious way to keep the banks solvent.9 '
VII. COULD REGULATION HAVE AVERTED THE CRISIS?
Based on my model, I identify four elements that played a large role
in creating the crisis: 1) unrealistic housing appreciation,; 2) agency
conflicts of securitization; 3) high leverage ratios of banks; and 4)
percentage of CDOs in the bank asset portfolio. I address the role
that each element played and then discuss whether regulation could
have mollified each element of the crisis.
Unrealistic Housing Appreciation
As discussed in Section IV housing appreciation and prices may
have been artificially high due to cheap credit.9 2 In fact, my analysis
suggested that cheap credit and housing appreciation fed one an-
other." Expected appreciation made lending less risky because the
loss-given-default became substantially lower if house foreclosure was
profitable. When housing prices plummeted, all the loans backed
by these homes also plummeted in value."
It is not clear that any type of regulation would have recognized or
prohibited this dangerous reverse feedback loop between lending and
home prices. In a free market, rational traders should have figured
out this reverse feedback mechanism." They would have shorted
property futures, and home values would have been kept at a rational
expected appreciation." If the free market could not figure this out,
then it is not clear that any regulation could have prevented it."
MBS. Id. Thus, the rule has now been changed so that banks can value
these securities using a discounted cash flows valuation model that better
represents the long term value of these assets. Id.
90. See Steve Lohr, Ailing Banks May Require More Aid to Keep Solvent, N.Y. TIMES,
(Feb. 13, 2009), http:www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/business/economy/
13insolvent.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1315847086-jiHP+z5WKU9Li/OMvp
Bjaw.
91. Id.
92. See supra Section IV.
93. See supra Section IV
94. See supra Section IV.
95. See supra Section IV.
96. See Robert Shiller, Needed: A Clearer Crystal Ball, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at
BU4.
97. See Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 4
VA. L. & Bus. REv. 231, 260 (2009).
98. See generally, Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom?: The Economic
Philosphy Behind the 2008 Financial Cisis, 4 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 139, 178
(2009) (citing The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong.
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Some have argued that rating agencies should be held accountable
for not having realized that housing prices were appreciating too
quickly." But this seems incorrect. If the majority of hedge funds
that could have made a substantial amount of money on this could
not anticipate this outcome, it seems ridiculous that a rating agency
with no monetary motivation would have recognized the relationship.
Thus any regulation could have prevented unrealistic housing
appreciation.100
Agency Problems of Securitization
While regulation could have alleviated the agency problems of
securitization,'o' it is not clear that this would have been enough to
stop the crisis if housing prices were unrealistically high. 0 2
The easiest piece of regulation that might have alleviated the
agency problems would have been to force each Countrywide location
to hold a random subset of the loans that they generated.'1 3 A varia-
tion of this is actually rather common in the practice of securitiza-
tion.1o The originator is often asked to hold the lowest rated tranche
of debt in order to ensure that the originator does not originate low
quality loans.0"' These arrangements are usually contracted between
originators and arrangers.' 06
The above described arrangement was never forced by regulation
because it was assumed that the private sector would rationally choose
to enter into these arrangements. However, as the housing market
boomed, arrangers became less demanding of these contracts because
they were so bullish on the housing market."o"
149 (2008) (statement of Alan Greenspan, former Chairman, Bd. of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
99. Cf Nat'l Comm. on the Causes of the Fin, and Econ. Crisis in the United
States, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xix,(2011) ("Financial institu-
tions and credit rating agencies embraced mathematic models as reliable
predictors of risk, replacing judgment in too many instances. Too often,
risk management became risk justification."), available at http://fcic-static.
law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic-final-report-full.pdf [here-
inafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT].
100. See supra Section VII.
101. See generally Turgeon, supra note 98.
102. See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 99, at 125.
103. When loans are securitized they are usually diced into tranches. See Louisa
C. Crampton, Originating Lender Bank Liability to Participants in the B-Tranche
of a Leveraged Loan, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 255, 255 (1997). The lowest rated
tranche will be the first to be hit by defaults. See id. In securitization ar-
rangements it is actually very common to have the originator of a security
hold the lowest tranche. See id.
104. SeeJeffrey D. Clements, Defining the Subprime Lending Problem: The View From
a State Enforcement Agency, 1668 P.L.I. CORP. 29, 40 (2008).
105. See id. at 41.
106. See 18 AM. JUR. 3d Proof of Facts § 559 (1992).
107. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Watcher, Explaining the Housing Bubble, (U.
Pa.Inst. for L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-15, 2010).
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While regulation requiring originators to hold some portion of the
loans might have alleviated the agency problems,"o it is not clear how
we should have known that the private sector would not rationally self-
regulate this arrangement. Again, this does not appear to be bad be-
havior, it merely looks like overly bullish expectations. Furthermore,
as I illustrated in Section V by my model, alleviating agency costs
would not have stopped bank insolvency if the plunge in housing
prices was drastic enough.109
Overly High Leverage Ratios
The banks were probably over-levered and had there been more
restrictions on leverage ratios for banks, it is possible that the banks
would not have been at risk of insolvency even if the housing bubble
had burst unexpectedly.
Consider the following bank balance sheet that is only levered at 10
to 1.
COO 107,500 0Deposits 64,500.0
Other Loans 107,5000 Long term 64,500 0
Short term 64,500 0
Equity
Equity 21.500.0
This bank would not have become insolvent in any of the scenarios
that I discussed earlier. In fact, housing prices would have to decline
38 percent before banks (in my model) would be at risk of insolvency.
Therefore, it seems possible that lifting the leverage restrictions on
investment banks substantially contributed to the ultimate insolvency
of banks.
Percentage of CDOs in the Bank Portfolio
If banks were not allowed to have so much of their assets in CDOs,
then perhaps the crisis could have been averted."o This is the pri-
mary purpose of the Basel system."' However, in this particular case
108. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1274 (2002).
109. See Jeffrey A. Miron, Bailout or Bankruptcy, CATO J. (June 2009), available at
www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29nl/cj29nl-1.pdf.
110. Prior to the subprime crisis in 2007, more than $100 billion in CDOs were
issued each year. Francis A. Longstaff & Brett Myers, Valuing Toxic Assets: An
Analysis of CDO Equity 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14871, 2009).
111. See W. Ronald Gard, George Bailey in the Twenty-First Century: Are We Moving to
the Postmodern Era in International Financial Regulation with Basel II?, 8 TRANs-
Why the Crisis Was Unavoidable
it failed. This failure was due to the fact that CDOs were AAA
securities.'
However, as I have discussed, the reason these CDOs were AAA se-
curities was because the entire market was bullish on housing. It is
not clear, based on my model, that these CDOs should not have been
AAA if I assumed that there was true economic appreciation in
housing.
Conclusion Regarding Regulation
Based on my model it seems as if the only clear regulation that
could have been conceived prior to this crisis would have been requir-
ing lower leverage ratios by banks."' No other regulation discussed
above seems as if it could have actually avoided bank insolvency based
on this, admittedly, simplified model.'"
CONCLUSION
This paper constructed a simple economic model to illustrate that
only minor mispricing and poor assumptions were required to create
a financial crisis. In addition, my model indicates that the only regula-
tion that would have prevented the crisis would have been better regu-
lation of bank leverage. The simplicity of the model limits how much
it can prove and I am not suggesting that misbehavior by market par-
ticipants did not substantially exacerbated the crisis. However, the
model provides an important illustrative way of viewing the crisis and
its origin.
ACTIONs: TENNJ. Bus. L. 161, 188 (2006) ("Minimum capital requirements
continue to be the focus of Basel II, but their determination and monitor-
ing is much more complex.").
112. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34412., AVERTING FINANCIAl.
CRIsIs 4 (2008). ("Despite their complexity, [collateralized debt obliga-
tions] . . .were often able to obtain AAA ratings. . .").
113. Compare supra Section V (showing that where a model had a leverage ratio
of 20 to 1 and 50 percent of its assets in the form of CDOs, when faced with
the burst of an artificially inflated housing appreciation bubble, home
loans needed only to decrease by 16.5 percent for the bank to become in-
solvent), with Section VII (showing that a model with a leverage ratio of 10
to 1 and 50 percent of its assets in the form of CDOs would require housing
prices to decline 38% before it ran the risk of insolvency).
114. Compare discussion supra Section VII.1-2,4 (arguing that regulation could
not have prevented unrealistic housing appreciation or the agency
problems of securitization, and that regulation failed with regard to restric-
tions on the amount of CDOs in bank portfolios), with Section VII.3 (argu-
ing that lower leverage ratios could have averted the crisis, even if the
housing bubble burst unexpectedly).
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